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CHAPTER 4 
Torts 
ROBERT J. SHERER 
A. DECISIONS 
§4.1. What is an actionable tort. The four sons of Patrick O'Dea, 
deceased, brought an action of tort against the operator of a funeral 
home, alleging that they were Patrick's next of kin, that the defendant 
"unlawfully and without right, in willful disregard and careless 
ignorance of the plaintiffs' rights ... did take charge of the body, 
funeral and burial" of the decedent, all of which caused the plaintiffs 
"great anguish of mind."l The Supreme Judicial Court, on appeal, 
affirmed an order sustaining a demurrer to the declaration. The 
opinion of the Court, by Mr. Justice Kirk, rested upon the lack of 
standing shown on the face of the plaintiffs' declaration, there being 
no allegation of the absence of a surviving spouse or of contrary 
directions by the decedent. In view of this disposition of the case, "[w]e 
need not discuss the issue of damages which, in any event, would be 
resolved against the plaintiffs."2 Since the rule of SPade v. Lynn & 
Boston R.R.8 bars recovery of damages for mental anguish not con-
nected with a traumatic injury, the plaintiffs' allegation that the 
defendant's action caused them great anguish of mind is clearly an 
insufficient allegation of actual damage to them. In the absence of 
damage there is no cause of action in tort in Massachusetts.4 What-
ever equitable relief he might be entitled to, it is doubtful that any 
person showing the requisite standing to sue, could show such damages 
as to entitle him to maintain an action of tort for the wrongful burial 
of his decedent. 
The Court disposed of another case without passing on the question 
of whether the "tort" was actionable. Frick v. Boyd5 was a suit in 
equity to enjoin publication of an autobiography containing many 
references to the plaintiff, who was the defendant's former employer, 
and to the employer'S family, all of which were highly laudatory. 
They described the plaintiff's work of establishing a vacation home 
for deserving girls. Pointing out that it could "perceive nothing which 
ROBERT J. SHERER is a member of the firm of Roche and Leen, Boston. 
§4.1. I O'Dea v. Mitchell, 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 127,213 N.E.2d 870. 
2Id. at 149, 213 N.E.2d at 872. 
8168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). 
4 Sullivan v. H.P. Hood Be Sons, Inc., 341 Mass. 216, 168 N.E.2d 80 (1960). 
51966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 245, 214 N.E.2d 460. 
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could reasonably tend to lower Miss Frick in the esteem of her friends 
or the general public,"6 the Court declined to rule whether any 
common law right of privacy exists in Massachusetts and ordered the 
bill dismissed. 
The Frick case was heard in January and decided on February 9. At 
the April sitting the Court heard Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co.,7 
involving companion actions of tort and contract-or-tort, which came 
up on appeals from orders sustaining demurrers. The plaintiffs were 
mother and son and had, with the mother's consent, been portrayed 
in one of the "Globe Santa" articles in November, 1962. At their 
request, the real name and address were not published. Neighbors and 
family of the plaintiff knew that the photograph had been taken and 
recognized the picture of Michael Brauer when it appeared. Over two 
years later, the same photograph was used over a caption "Help for 
the Mentally Retarded." Portions of the photograph were purposely 
obliterated to prevent recognition. Again preserving the question of 
whether a right of privacy exists as an actionable tort,S the Court 
affirmed the demurrer as to the count for invasion of privacy.9 Mr. 
Justice Spalding pointed out that only the fact that Michael was not 
identifiable from the photograph distinguished the case from Peay v. 
Curtis Publishing CO.,10 Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co.p and 
Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co.p which have held that" '[pJublicity 
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye' is action-
able as an invasion of his right of privacy."13 However, such a cause of 
action would require "acts which are sufficient in themselves to 
familiarize the public with either the name, likeness, or other means 
of identifying the plaintiff,"14 but in the present case, the "recognition 
by a small group of intimates, familiar not only with the subject but 
with the circumstances under which the photograph was taken, falls 
short of the kind of publicity upon which an action for the invasion of 
privacy, if acknowledged to exist, would have to be based."15 
Despite the two decisions holding that no cause of action was in fact 
made out, the threshold question of whether the cause exists is still 
open. 
§4.2. Libel and slander. The Brauer case 1 also contained counts 
on behalf of the mother and son for libel based upon the same photo-
graph. In support of its demurrer to the libel count, the defendant 
6Id. at 247-248, 214 N.E.2d at 462. 
71966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 903, 217 N.E.2d 736. 
sId. at 907, 217 N.E.2d at 739. 
9 See §4.2 infra, for a discussion of the libel counts. 
1078 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948). 
11 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951). 
12207 Misc. 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1955). 
131966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 903, 907, 217 N.E.2d 736, 739. 
14 Id. at 907,217 N.E.2d at 740. 
15Id. at 907-908, 217 N.E.2d at 940 (emphasis supplied). 
§4.2. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 903, 217 N.E.2d 736, also noted in §4.1 supra. 
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argued that since Michael's identifying characteristics were obscured, 
nothing defamatory was said of him, which the Court construed as an 
argument that "no one who had not been otherwise informed of the 
facts relating to the photograph's first publication could determine 
that it depicts Michael."2 Having so construed the defendant's argu-
ment, the Court pronounced it "unsound." For the purpose of the 
demurrer, the allegation that Michael's friends, relatives and former 
neighbors recognized the picture of him was held a sufficient allegation 
of publication, which, in conjunction with the caption of the photo-
graph,S could be construed as imputing that Michael was mentally 
retarded. 
In Sperry Rand Corp. v. Hill,4 alleging that co-authorship of an 
article in a medical journal purportedly endorsing the manufacturer's 
electric shaver had been falsely imputed to him and used as adver-
tising, a dermatologist sued in the Federal District Court for Massa-
chusetts under the New York "right of privacy law"5 and for damages 
for libel for publication of the article in Massachusetts and New York. 
A jury awarded damages of $50,000 for libel in Massachusetts and New 
York and for invasion of privacy under the New York law and an 
additional $20,000 for punitive damages for libel and invasion of 
privacy, limited to New York. The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the judgment, holding that (a) by his long silence after the 
national advertising campaign began, the dermatologist was estopped 
to deny his authorship of the article in the medical journal and thus 
could not recover under the statute; (b) on the libel counts, the jury 
was warranted in finding that the manufacturer was at least jointly 
responsible for attributing to the dermatologist authorship in the 
medical magazine of a poorly written, scientifically inadequate, 
medically unsound and possibly unethical article; (c) since the $50,000 
verdict did not segregate damages under (a) and (b), there must be a 
new trial on the issue of compensatory damages; and (d) since the 
publication was not made with actual malice, New York law would 
not permit the recovery of punitive damages. 
While it may appear contradictory to deny recovery under the New 
York statute on the basis of estoppel while permitting recovery on the 
libel counts, the statutory count arose on publication in an advertising 
campaign some months after the article's original publication, whereas 
the libel counts referred to the first publication of the article itself, to 
which the jury found the plaintiff had not consented to attach his 
name. 
The Court in a footnote also pointed out what it terms two inter-
2Id. at 905, 217 N.E.2d at 739. 
S See Mabardi v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 347 Mass. 411, 198 N.E.2d 304 
(1964), discussed in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §5.3. 
4356 F.2d 181 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub nom. Hill v. Sperry Rand Corp., 
384 U.S. 973 (1966). 
1\ N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §51. 
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esting questions of choice of law which it did not reach.6 One is 
whether New York law is at all applicable; the other whether, even if 
New York law were applicable, an award of punitive damages there-
under is not barred by General Laws, Chapter 231, Section 73, which 
provides that "in no action of slander or libel shall exemplary or 
punitive damages be allowed." The insertion of this provision as part 
of the practice act would at least suggest that Massachusetts would 
not permit such a recovery even in a cause of action arising in another 
state. 
§4.3. Res ipsa loquitur. A variety store clerk, who was injured 
when a bottle of ale he was handling exploded, brought companion 
actions of tort against the brewer-bottler and the distributor of the 
ale. l On exceptions taken by both defendants after a verdict for the 
plaintiff in each case, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled (a) that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not be applied in the case against 
the distributor, whose control of the bottle did not commence until 
after the bottling process had been completed,2 and (b) that the case 
against the bottler failed because the plaintiff's evidence failed to 
negate improper handling by the distributor or some other person 
after the bottle had left the brewery.3 The plaintiff testified that he 
had not mishandled the bottle, and that the area in which it was 
stored was one from which customers of the store were excluded. While 
the plaintiff offered in evidence the distributor's answers to interroga-
tories stating that due care was used in handling the bottles, this 
evidence was limited to the action against the distributor and was 
inadmissible as to the bottler. Calling the distributor or its representa-
tive as a witness and introducing the same evidence at the trial would 
apparently have filled this void in the plaintiff's case against the 
bottIer. 
§4.4. Contributory negligence. Since 1957, O'Neil v. W. T. Grant 
CO.I has posed a dilemma for lawyers trying to prove a case on behalf 
of a plaintiff injured in a fall on another's premises. In O'Neil a 
customer in a Boston store was injured when, in leaving the ladies' 
room, she slipped on a collection of snow and slush which had accumu-
lated on the floor and which she had seen and through which she had 
walked in going into the ladies' room a few minutes earlier. The Court, 
in an opinion by the late Mr. Justice Counihan, assumed without 
deciding "that the dangerous condition of the landing had existed 
long enough so that the defendant was negligent in permitting it to 
6 Sperry Rand Corp. v. Hill, 356 F.2d 181, 188 n.l3 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub 
nom. Hill v. Sperry Rand Corp., 384 U.S. 973 (1966). 
§4.3. I Rafferty v. The Hull Brewing Co., 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 367, 215 N.E.2d 85. 
2Id. at 369, 215 N.E.2d at 87. 
3Id. at 370, 215 N.E.2d at 87. 
§4.4. 1335 Mass. 234, 139 N.E.2d 406 (1957). 
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continue," but noted that it was "indisputable that on her own 
testimony she observed the condition of the floor and its attendant 
dangers were obvious to her."2 The Court concluded that, as a matter 
of law, the plaintiff's own testimony required a finding that she was 
guilty of contributory negligence and could not prevail, citing the 
following statement from Gambardello v. H. ]. Seiler CO.,3 decided a 
month earlier: "[tJo hold on this evidence that a finding was warranted 
that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care would render the 
doctrine of contributory negligence virtually meaningless."4 The 
dilemma posed by O'Neil was that a plaintiff, not being able to prove 
the origin of a defect or foreign substance, often must prove neg-
ligence by showing that the defect was so apparent and had been 
there sufficiently long so that the defendant either knew or should 
have known of its existence; on the other hand, by taking this 
approach, a plaintiff might find himself proving that the defect was 
so apparent that he himself should have noticed and avoided it. 
In Griffin v. Demerjian,5 decided during the 1966 SURVEY year, the 
Court overruled O'Neil and allowed recovery in favor of a plaintiff 
injured when her foot caught in a wire display rack three or four 
inches from the stool on which she sat at the defendant's soda fountain. 
Mr. Justice Whittemore6 stated in the opinion of the Court: "It was 
not contributory negligence as a matter of law to use this customer 
space in response to the invitation and to leave it in the way described, 
regardless of whether the plaintiff had the position of the visible rack 
in mind or should have."7 
§4.5. Deceit. The usual argument in every deceit case is whether 
the defendant's statements to the plaintiff were hopes, promises, 
"seller's talk," or representations of something as an existing fact.l 
Magnat Corp. v. B r/:r B Electroplating CO.2 was no exception. The 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant had induced it to move its 
business from New Jersey to Massachusetts by misrepresenting (1) that 
the defendant had a substantial demand for and orders for aluminum 
rollers, (2) that it had the capacity to produce aluminum cylinders 
suitable for plating by the plaintiff, and (3) that its electroplating 
orders for the plaintiff would not fall below 20,000 square inches a 
day. The plaintiff's president testified that all of these statements were 
made in terms of affirmative statements of fact; the defendant's 
2Id. at 235, 139 N.E.2d at 407. 
3335 Mass. 49, 138 N.E.2d 603 (1956). 
4335 Mass. at 52, 138 N.E.2d at 604. In Gambardello the plaintiff dived off a 
board into a swimming pool without looking and struck a raft which was in the 
water just below. 
51965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1517,213 N.E.2d 384. 
6 Justice Whittemore and Chief Justice Wilkins were the only justices of those 
who decided Griffin who also participated in O'Neil. 
7 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1518, 213 N.E.2d at 385. 
§4.5. 1 See 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §5.6; 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.7. 
2358 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1966). 
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position was that all of them were made in terms of hope.3 A jury 
found for the plaintiff after the district denied the defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that 
the "evidence would warrant the conclusion that ... [the defendant] 
misrepresented that he knew the capabilities of the new equipment, 
and that plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation to its 
detriment."4 The testimony upon which this finding was presumably 
based was that of the plaintiff's principal officer who gave the following 
account of the response of the defendant's principal officer when the 
former told the latter that it could not live with the surface which it 
was then plating: 
He says, "Well, there shouldn't be too much concern as far as that 
goes." So he said he would be or he could assure us that our 
surface that we would receive from him would be of the same 
appearance as the [extruded] bar we were doing in the shop at 
that particular time ... [and] that there would be no worries in 
the surface of the material,5 
If the view expressed by this author in the 1964 SURVEy6 that Saxon 
Theatre Corp. of Boston v. Sage7 indicated that Barrett Associates v. 
Aronson8 might mark the limits to which the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court would go in holding a representation to be factual 
rather than promissory was correct, one wonders just where on the 
scale the Magnat case fits. In Barrett, a representation that a defendant 
intended to take no salary until a venture was earning a profit and 
that he stood to lose $25,000 if the business failed was held actionable, 
if false. On the other hand, in Saxon a false representation of the 
defendant's intention to construct a theatre on certain property and 
lease it to the plaintiff to operate under a long-term lease was held to 
be too vague and indefinite to support an action of either contract or 
tort. The representations in Magnat to one in a related business as to 
the capacity of a plant not yet in operation and as to future orders 
seem not reasonably to be construed as representations of an existing 
fact, whatever the representation of a "substantial demand" for rollers 
may have meant or whatever effect it may have had in inducing the 
plaintiff to move. While not going as far as the plaintiff in Saxon asked 
the Massachusetts Court to go, this case apparently has crossed the line 
drawn at Barrett. 
§4.6. Products liability: Dangerous instrumentality. A camping 
stove exploded the first time it was used and a minor child and her 
father sued the manufacturers of the stove.1 In view of evidence that 
3Id. at 796. 
4Id. at 797. 
I) Id. at 796·797. 
8 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §5.6. 
7347 Mass. 662, 200 N.E.2d 241 (1964). 
8346 Mass. 150, 190 N.E.2d 867 (1963). 
§4.6. 1 Beauchesne v. The Coleman Co., 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 705, 216 N.E.2d 96. 
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the "air wire unit" in the gasoline tank attached to the stove was 
defective and caused the explosion, the Supreme Judicial Court, 
following Carter v. Yardley &- CO.,2 upheld a verdict for the plaintiff, 
the evidence being sufficient to show "that the defendant manufac-
tured a product which it knew or should have known was a potentially 
dangerous instrumentality if defective through want of care of the 
defendant and which, being in the same condition as when it left the 
place of manufacture, exploded when first employed by the . . . 
[plaintiffJ·"3 
In Corlett v. Hi Lo Corp.,4 on the other hand, a plaintiff, injured 
when struck by a trailer which separated from a tractor leased to the 
plaintiff's employer by the defendant, lost because, although he 
showed the tractor was defective at the time of the accident, he failed 
to show it was defective at the time of the leasing and failed to negate 
improper handling since the leasing.5 
§4.7. Common carrier. A person assaulted by a taxi cab operator 
after entering his cab was entitled to recover judgment against the 
cab company, the Court holding that he had acquired the status of a 
passenger and was owed the highest duty of care by the defendant.1 
§4.8. Seamen. Three cases involving injuries to or the death of a 
seaman were before the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1966 
SURVEY year. Marino v. Trawler Emil C, Inc. 1 was an action brought 
by the administratrix of a "fish spotter" killed in a plane crash against 
the owners and operators of four Gloucester fishing vessels for whom 
he was spotting. The decedent was killed when the plane in which he 
was riding crashed with another plane which was also spotting for the 
same vessels. The action was brought under the Jones Act2 and, in the 
alternative, under the Massachusetts death statute.3 The trial judge 
directed verdicts for all defendants on the Jones Act counts and the 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, there being no evidence that the 
decedent was a member of the crew of any of the vessels.4 On the 
Massachusetts death statute counts, a verdict for the plaintiff was 
allowed to stand, the Court ruling that: (1) the jury could have found 
it negligent to permit the pilot of the other plane in the crash to fly 
the plane and spot fish simultaneously without taking special pre-
cautions to prevent injury; (2) the jury could have found that the 
2319 Mass. 92, 98. 103, 64 N.E.2d 693. 697, 700 (1946). 
31966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 705, 706, 216 N.E.2d 96, 97. 
4 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 425, 215 N.E.2d 89. 
5 See also Rafferty v. The Hull Brewing Co .• 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 367. 215 N.E.2d 
85, discussed in §4.3 supra. 
§4.7. 1 Gilmore v. Acme Taxi Co., 349 Mass. 651, 212 N.E.2d 235 (1965). 
§4.8. 1350 Mass. 88, 213 N.E.2d 238 (1966). 
246 U.S.C. §688 (1964). 
3 G.L .• c. 229. §2C. 
4 This is a prerequisite to maintaining an action under the Jones Act, Swanson 
v. Marra Bros .• Inc., 328 U.S. I, 66 Sup. Ct. 869, 90 L. Ed. 1045 (1946). 
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planes operated under orders· from the boats to such art extent that 
the pilots could be found to be the servants of the defendants; and 
(3) the pilots' lack of qualifying credentials, lack of a flight plan, the 
fact that the other pilot doubled as a spotter, and the failure of the 
owner of the plane to warn the pilot of an oil leak, could all have been 
found to be causes of the accident. 
Bono v. Ocean Wave, Inc.r" was an action under the Jones Act and 
also under the general maritime law for unseaworthiness. It came up 
on exceptions to the direction of verdicts for the defendant on each 
count. The plaintiff had reported to the captain that salt water leaks 
in the trunk of the pilot house were causing rust and corrosion 
affecting the engine and clutch. Since no correction was attempted, 
the conditioned worsened. The plaintiff was injured when, as he was 
removing the last of six corroded bolts with a socket wrench while 
attempting to remove a plate in order to time the engine, the head of 
the bolt sheared off, causing him to fall and sustain a head injury. This 
evidence was held sufficient to take the Jones Act count for negligence 
to the jury under the federal standards applicable to the case.6 The 
same evidence was also held sufficient to support the count for un-
seaworthiness, the evidence indicating a breach of the shipowner's 
absolute duty to furnish a seaworthy ship.7 This duty is breached if 
the vessel, while not totally unseaworthy, is unseaworthy with respect 
to the plaintiff.s 
In Boudreau v. Boat Andrea G Corp.9 a count under the Jones Act 
was combined with a count under the Death on the High Seas Act. 
The Court ruled that a state court has no jurisdiction of a case under 
the Death on the High Seas Act and dismissed that count, a result 
clearly indicated by the language of the act giving the personal repre-
sentative of the decedent a right to "maintain a suit for damages in the 
district courts of the United States."10 The Jones Act,n on the other 
hand, gives a right of action to an injured seaman or the personal 
representative of a deceased seaman to "maintain an action for 
damages at law, with the right of trial by jury" and makes applicable 
"all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-
law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway em-
ployees .... "12 On the merits of the Jones Act count, the evidence was 
that the decedent, who had a pre-existing heart condition, died after 
II 350 Mass. 470, 215 N.E.2d 666 (1966). 
6 Keough v. Cefalo, 330 Mass. 57, 60, 110 N.E.2d 919, 921 (1953). 
7 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549, 80 Sup. Ct. 926, 932, 4 L. Ed. 
2d 941, 948 (1960). 
S McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 227, 78 Sup. Ct. 1201, 1205, 
2 L. Ed. 2d 1272, 1277 (1958). 
9350 Mass. 473, 215 N.E.2d 907 (1966), also noted in §IO.l infra. 
1046 U.S.C. §761 (1964). 
11 40 U.S.C. §688 (1964). 
12 This is a reference to the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 
§§51-60 (1964), actions arising under which are within the concurrent jurisdiction 
of stat\! and federal courts. 
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exerting extraordinary physical effort to open the door of the pilot 
house to obtain relief from its "terribly hot" and "stuffy" atmosphere. 
The pilot house was hot and stuffy because of a defective heat regu-
lator, a condition that had existed for some time. The Court sustained 
exceptions to a trial judge's action in directing a verdict for the 
defendant, holding that, under the federal standard established by 
such cases as Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R.,13 Tenant v. Peoria & 
Pekin Ry.,14 Schultz v. Pennsylvania R.R.p and Ferguson v. Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc.,16 the evidence was sufficient to require sub-
mission of the case to the jury. 
§4.9. Medical malpractice. The administrator of a person who 
died six years after an operation brought an action against the surgeon 
who left within the patient's system a surgical clamp which rusted, 
broke and lodged within two portions of his intestine. The adminis-
trator also sought recovery against a doctor who had subsequently 
treated the patient and failed to diagnose the cause of his continuing 
gastric symptoms.1 A judge of the Superior Court directed verdicts in 
favor of both defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the 
cause of action against the surgeon accrued when he left the clamp in 
the patient and was thus barred by the two year statute of limitations,2 
citing Capucci v. Barone} which established the starting point of the 
period of limitations as the time a negligent operation was performed. 
The Court indicated that it might have been receptive to the idea of 
reconsidering Capucci and adopting something akin to the so-called 
"California" rule4 that a cause of action for a "hidden" injury occurs 
when discovered. It was confronted, however, by the legislature's 
rejection in 1965 of a proposed amendment to General Laws, Chapter 
260, Section 4, which would have provided that "actions of contract or 
tort for malpractice, error or mistake . . . shall be commenced only 
within two years after the injured party has knowledge of the facts 
which give rise to a cause of action but only within five years after the 
cause of action accrues."5 Both the language of the proposed amend-
ment and its rejection were accepted by the Court as a legislative 
reaffirmation of the Capucci rule. 
The Court held, however, that a cause of action in negligence was 
made out against the second doctor. 
He and one other physician testified that examination by X-ray 
was proper medical practice in diagnosing such complaints as 
13352 U.S. 500, 77 Sup. Ct. 443, I L. Ed. 2d 493 (1957). 
14321 U.S. 29, 64 Sup. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520 (1944). 
15350 U.S. 523, 76 Sup. Ct. 608, 100 L. Ed. 668 (1956). 
16352 U.S. 521, 77 Sup. Ct. 457, I L. Ed. 2d 511 (1957). 
§4.9. 1 Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966). 
2 G.L., c. 260 §4; c. 229, §2C. 
3266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1919). 
4 Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 312, 57 P.2d 908, 913 (1936). 
5 House Doc. No. 530 (1965). This form of statute has been adopted in Alabama, 
Ala. Code tit. 7, §25 (1960), and Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §52-584 (1958). 
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Pasquale's. An X-ray examination at the Fallon Clinic disclosed 
the presence of the clamp. Thus the jury could have found that 
Dr. Lentino did not employ that "reasonable degree of learning, 
skill and experience which is ordinarily possessed by others of his 
profession in the community where he practices, having regard 
to the current state of advance of the profession."6 
§4.10. Restraint of trade. The Supreme Judicial Court declined 
to become involved in what it terms a religious controversy in 
United Kosher Butchers Association v. Associated Synagogues of 
Greater Boston, Inc.! The plaintiff, an incorporated association of 
most of the kosher meat markets in Greater Boston, alleged in its bill 
of complaint that since 1930 it had undertaken and conducted the 
certification and supervision of its member stores for adherence to the 
religious requirements relating to kosher meat and poultry, through 
the auspices of a rabbinical supervisor. The defendant, through its 
"Kashruth Commission" has, for many years, supervised and certified 
kosher caterers in Greater Boston. Since 1960, the defendant has 
refused to accept the plaintiff's certification, and has required that 
kosher caterers under its supervision purchase their meat only from 
stores under the defendant's supervision. As a result, numerous orders 
from caterers to member stores of the plaintiff were cancelled as well 
as several agreements between the plaintiff and its members. The bill 
charged restraint of trade and interference with contractual relations 
and sought injunctive relief and damages. A judge of the Superior 
Court sustained a demurrer on the ground that "the bill pertains to 
matters which are exclusively ecclesiastical under the orthodox Jewish 
religion and hence are not proper subjects for judicial inquiry."2 The 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the sustaining of the demurrer and 
ordered dismissal of the action. 
This summary disposition of the action is unfortunate, and is 
reached only by an unwarranted anticipation on the part of the Court 
of the problems with which it might be confronted if the merits were 
reached, such as "who has the authority to enforce Kashruth in Boston, 
what are the criteria for determining whether foods are kosher, and 
what procedures must the body in charge of Kashruth follow,"3 all of 
which it viewed as capable of determination "only by reference to 
Jewish law, a domain into which the courts will not venture."4 Were 
the Court's premise that all ot these issues would be presented by the 
case a valid one, their conclusion would be justified. The premise, 
however, is not supported by anything on the record before the Court. 
For the purpose of a hearing on the demurrer both the defendants and 
the Court are bound by the allegation in the bill that "[a]t no time 
61966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 475, 482, 215 N.E.2d 319, 323. 
§4.10. 1349 Mass. 595, 211 N.E.2d 332 (1965). 
2Id. at 598, 211 N .E.2d at 333. 
3Id. at 600, 211 N.E.2d at 335. 
4 Ibid. 
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during this controversy. , . have the defendants complained to the 
plaintiff's rabbinical advisor of any known or suspected irregularities 
or departures from strict Kashruth requirements in the performance of 
his duties."5 If it may be reasonably inferred from this statement that 
the plaintiff's rabbinical supervisor is as qualified as the defendant's 
in determining the religious questions involved, then the allegations of 
the bill are that the defendants are guilty of using their economic 
power over the caterers as a source of the plaintiff's business, to 
acquire a monopoly of the kosher food business in Greater Boston and 
that they have invoked their religious authority to do so where no real 
religious issue exists. 
The Court's reliance upon Cohen v. Silver,6 in support of the con-
clusion that" ... since the requirements of Kashruth are presented by 
Jewish law, the preparation of kosher food has traditionally been 
under the exclusive control of the rabbis,"7 appears misplaced. Cohen 
involved a kosher meat dealer who "never secured from the Vaad 
Hakashruth or from any rabbi a license or permit to do business as a 
wholesale dealer in kosher meat"8 and was barred from being a dealer 
in kosher meat after he had been guilty of serious violations of Jewish 
religious law and had ignored a summons to appear before a rab-
binical court. He thereafter brought a bill to enjoin the defendant 
rabbis from interfering with his business and injuring his property. In 
writing the opinion of the Court, which affirmed a final decree dis-
missing the bill, Chief Justice Rugg stated: "Courts are especially 
reluctant to interfere in a controversy which like the one at bar rests 
largely upon ecclesiastical dogma and rabbinical practices. As to 
matters of that nature religious organizations are themselves entitled 
to a pretty free hand under settled principles of law."9 
On its face, the controversy in United rested neither upon dogma 
nor upon rabbinical practices. On the record presented by the 
demurrer no religious controversy was apparent. By beating this hasty 
retreat from a controversy, the Court may have left a door open for 
grave infringements of rights subject to a court's protection. 
§4.11. Interference with business. In Walsh v. O'Neil,! the Su-
preme Judicial Court reaffirmed what it termed "a refusal to extend 
to the attorney-client relationship the principle that interference with 
an existing business relationship, if malicious or without justification, 
is actionable even though the relationship is not founded in a con-
tract."2 The prior cases to which the Court referred were Herbits v. 
Constitution Indemnity Co.,s and Tauro v. General Accident Fire and 
1\ Id. at 597, 211 N.E.2d at 333. 
6277 Mass. 230,178 N.E. 508 (1931). 
7349 Mass. 595, 599, 211 N.E.2d 332, 334 (1965). 
8277 Mass. 230, 234, 178 N.E. 508, 509-510 (1931) (emphasis supplied). 
9 Id. at 235, 178 N.E. at 510. 
§4.ll. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 633, 215 N.E.2d 915. 
2 Id. at 635-636, 215 N.E.2d at 917·918. 
S 279 Mass. 539, 181 N.E. 723 (1932). 
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Life Assurance Corp.,4 each of which held that no cause of action in 
tort lay in favor of a plaintiff's attorney against an insurer who settled 
a case with a plaintiff "behind the attorney's back," thus depriving 
him of an opportunity to earn or collect a fee. In Walsh the allegation 
was, in effect, that the defendants, both attorneys, conspired to take a 
client away from the plaintiff by circulating critical and libelous 
statements about his professional ability and conduct, by prosecuting 
a groundless bill in equity for an injunction, and by promises of 
political influence. In affirming an order sustaining a demurrer the 
Court, through Mr. Justice Whittemore, expressed the opinion that 
"[t]here is ... a strong public policy to assure one in need of legal help 
freedom to select an attorney, to change attorneys, and to seek and 
obtain advice as to the competency and suitability of any attorney for 
the particular need of the client."5 If this policy manifests itself by 
leaving the attorney, alone among those performing services, without 
redress for such injuries to his business, this is apparently one of the 
burdens which, like the prohibition against advertising or incorpora-
tion, one assumes upon entering the profession. 
§4.12. Unfair competition. The 1965 SURVEyl reported the case of 
Blanchard & Co. v. Charles Gilman & Son, Inc.,2 in which Judge 
Caffrey granted the plaintiff injunctive relief under General Laws, 
Chapter 10, Section 7A, against infringement in Massachusetts of the 
trade name "Blanchard" but cancelled the registration of the name as 
a trademark under the Lanham Act.3 On appeal by the plaintiff, the 
Court of Appeals this SURVEY year affirmed the cancellation of the 
trademark,4 not upon the ground that the registrations "have not 
become distinctive of the plaintiff'S goods in interstate commerce," 
upon which the District Court relied, but rather upon the ground 
that the evidence established that the defendant in fact used the name 
as a trademark prior to the plaintiff's registration. 
Davey Bros., Inc. v. Stop & Shop, Inc.5 was a suit in equity under 
the Unfair Sales Act6 to enjoin the defendant from selling items of 
merchandise at less than cost. While the trial judge found that the 
sales in question were below cost, he found that they were not made 
with intent to injure or destroy competition within the meaning of 
Section 14F of General Laws, Chapter 93, but were made "in good 
faith to meet competition," thus falling within the exemption of 
Section 14G(h). On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the "intent to 
injure ... or destroy" provision of Section 14F should be disregarded 
4297 Mass. 234, 8 N.E.2d 773 (1937). 
51966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 633, 636, 215 N.E.2d 915, 918. 
§4.12. 1 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §5.9. 
2239 F. Supp. 827 (D. Mass. 1965). 
3 15 U.S.C. §1057 (1964). 
4 Blanchard Importing &: Distributing Co. v. Charles Gilman &: Son, Inc., 353 
F.2d 400 (1st Cir. 1965). 
51966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 909, 217 N.E.2d 75l. 
6 G.L., c. 93, §§14E-14K. 
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because requiring such proof produces a less effectual administration 
of the law. The Court, however, felt bound to give meaning to the 
language of the statute and affirmed the decree dismissing the bill. The 
result reached by the Court is clearly the correct one under the statute 
as drawn but the case serves to underline the ineffectiveness of the 
statute.7 
Atlantic Wool Combing Co. v. Norfolk Mills, Inc.,s was an action 
for injunctive relief, damages, and an accounting for alleged misap-
propriation of a trade secret, namely, the design of certain machinery 
used in dehairing raw cashmere. The machinery was manufactured for 
the defendant by the same person who had, in accordance with a 
design prepared by an employee of the plaintiff, manufactured the 
same machinery for the plaintiff, promising at the time that he would 
not reproduce the parts for anyone else. The defendant was referred 
to this person by a former employee of the plaintiff, now employed by 
the defendant. This employee knew that the design of the machines 
was treated by the plaintiff as a trade secret. 
The United States District Court dismissed the action after a non-
jury trial, applying a patent-law-oriented standard in ruling that the 
machine's essential mechanical concepts were already embodied in 
another well known machine and that adaptation of the other machine 
to the exigencies of dehairing was a relatively simple undertaking for 
a competent technician. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
reversed, citing the statement in the Restatement of Torts §757, 
Comment b, that "novelty and invention are not requisite for a trade 
secret as they are for patentability . . . . The protection is merely 
against breach of faith and reprehensible means of learning another's 
secret. For this limited protection it is not appropriate to require also 
the kind of novelty and invention which is a requisite for patent-
ability."9 Because it found all of the necessary elements either 
established by the record or found by the judge, the Court reversed and 
remanded the case to the District Court to fashion appropriate relief. 
§4.13. Parent and child. DePasquale v. Dello Russo l was an action 
against the father of a minor (whose age does not appear in the record) 
for injuries caused to the plaintiff by the explosion of smoke bombs 
in the plaintiff's pocket as the result of the act of the defendant's son. 
There was evidence that prior to the day in question the defendant 
had purchased firecrackers for both the plaintiff and his own son. 
When they lit these firecrackers and threw them on the street he told 
them to be careful and go elsewhere. On another occasion the defen-
dant gave his son some "atomic pearls" which explode on contact with 
7 In the 28 years since the enactment of the statute the only previous case to 
reach the Supreme Judicial Court was Fournier v. Troianello, 332 Mass. 636, 127 
N.E.2d 167 (1955), in which the defendant apparently let all other defenses go by 
default and based his entire case on the claimed unconstitutionality of the statute. 
S 357 F.2d 866 (1st Cir. 1966). 
9Id. at 869. 
§4.13. l349 Mass. 655, 212 N.E.2d 237 (1965). 
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a hard object. When, on the following day, he found his son and the 
plaintiff throwing them from the second floor window at people and 
cars passing the house, he ordered them to stop and play elsewhere. 
The evidence of the defendant's admonitions to the boys was held to 
distinguish the case from Caldwell v. Zaher,2 where the declaration, as 
to which the Superior Court had sustained a demurrer, alleged that the 
parent, knowing of the child's dangerous propensitites, "did nothing." 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order on the demurrer. The 
Court pointed out that in the present case the defendant responded to 
both incidents involving his son by ordering him to be careful and to 
move to a more suitable place. Mr. Justice Spalding stated: "To permit 
liability to be imposed in these circumstances would constitute a sub-
stantial extension of the rule set forth in Caldwell v. Zaher, a course 
we decline to adopt. A contrary holding would go far toward exposing 
parents to liability for the torts of their children solely because of 
their parenthood."3 The legislature has, of course, consistently rejected 
proposed legislation to impose vicarious liability on parents for the 
torts of their minor children.4 
B. LEGISLATION 
§4.14. Wrongful death. The Wrongful Death Act1 was amended, 
effective January 1, 1966, by increasing the minimum amount re-
coverable to $5000 and the maximum to $50,000.2 
§4.15. Guest passengers. The legislature rejected a bill to permit 
a passenger injured in a motor vehicle accident to recover for the 
ordinary negligence of the operator.1 An earlier bill on the same 
subject2 was referred to the Judicial Council for investigation.s 
§4.16. Imputation of negligence. The legislature has abrogated 
the rule of Wheeler v. Darmochwat/ permitting an inference that the 
owner of an automobile riding in it while another is driving has 
retained the right to control its operation. Chapter 450 of the Acts of 
1966 has inserted a new Section 85F in General Laws, Chapter 231, 
which provides: 
In an action to recover damages for death or' for injuries or 
property damage arising out of an accident or collision in which 
a motor vehicle was involved while the owner thereof was a 
2344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 300 (1962), noted in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.1. 
3349 Mass. 655, 658, 212 N.E.2d 237, 240 (1965). 
4 H.R. Doc. Nos. 1946, 2143 (1965); S. Doc. No. 180 (1965). 
§4.l4. 1 G.L., c. 229, §2. 
2 Acts of 1965, c. 683. 
§4.l5. 1 H.R. Doc. No. 2676 (1966); S. Doc. No. 240 (1966). 
2 H.R. Doc. No. 140 (1965). 
3 Resolves of 1965, c. 140. 
§4.l6. 1280 Mass. 553, 183 N.E. 55 (1932). 
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passenger therein, the negligence of the operator of such motor 
vehicle shall not be imputed to the owner for the sole reason that 
he was a passenger. 
The act was approved July 26, 1966. It is a procedural statute and 
presumably applies, as a rule of evidence, to any cases tried after its 
effective date. It also appears to apply to the owner as both plaintiff 
and defendant. 
§4.17. Legislative rejects. The legislature rejected bills which 
would have (a) permitted malpractice actions against attorneys to 
survive,l (b) abolished the immunity from tort liability of charitable 
corporations,2 and (c) established the "attractive nuisance" doctrine.s 
§4.17. 1 H.R. Doc. No. 2299 (1966). See Gallagher v. First National Bank of 
Boston, 346 Mass. 587, 195 N.E.2d 68 (1964), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§5.8; Connors v. Newton National Bank, 336 Mass. 649, 147 N.E.2d 185 (1958); 
Jenks v. Hoag, 179 Mass. 583, 61 N.E. 221 (1901). 
2 H.R. Doc. No. 2462 (1966). See 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.5. 
S H.R. Doc. No. 1446 (1966). 
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